The Ford thesis argued that there was a short-term causal relationship between British overseas investment and British merchandise exports in the late nineteenth century. However, economic historians since Ford have found little empirical evidence in support of this argument. Using data on bilateral British lending, this article finds that such a relationship did exist, with British ex ante lending preceding merchandise exports by two years. A case study of New Zealand, which had an extraordinarily high share of Britain in its imports, reveals that the relationship was conditional upon the lending being allocated to social overhead capital.
INTRODUCTION
One of the main contributions of the Ford thesis was to identify a causal relationship between British capital and merchandise exports during the late nineteenth century, whereby British ex ante lending to a given country preceded an increase in British merchandise exports to that country by a period of one or two years. 1 Ford specifies two channels of causation. First, since the majority of British overseas lending was allocated to social overhead projects, these projects required capital goods, such as machinery and steel, which Britain exported in abundance. Second, lending tended to increase the income of the borrowing country and thus raise its demand for manufactured consumption goods, which Britain also exported.
According to Ford, the causal relationship between British capital and merchandise exports functioned as an important equilibrating mechanism in the gold standard regime of the late nineteenth century. 3 Increased demand for merchandise exports diminished the extent to which overseas lending was settled in Britain's multilateral balance of payments through a transfer of specie, ceteris paribus. As the historical record indicates, the outflow of specie from Britain, even during peak periods such as the late 1860s, remained only a small component of the balance of payments. 4 Equilibrating mechanisms operated to prevent the acute outflow of specie from Britain, but was Ford's proposed relationship between British capital and merchandise exports one of these mechanisms? Subsequent scholars have expressed their doubts.
For the purposes of this paper, it will prove convenient to conceptualise Ford's argument as a lending-export loop, albeit an imperfect loop, since borrowed British capital was oftentimes diverted toward the purchase of imports from countries other than Britain. On this point, Brown argues that borrowing countries had, on average, low marginal propensities to import either capital or consumption goods from Britain. 5 In other words, the diversion of capital from the lending-export loop was significant. In support of this assertion, he invokes Tinbergen's finding that the marginal effect of British capital exports on British capital goods exports was just one- 1 Ford, British foreign lending, p. 305. Ex ante lending occurred when a creditor country committed to exporting capital, with the commitment usually taking the form of a primary security issue. The lending became ex post when the creditor country country actually exported merchandise, services, or specie. 2 Simon, Portfolio foreign investment, p. 25. Between 1865 and 1914, nearly 70% of British portfolio foreign lending was directed toward social overhead capital. 3 Ford, Gold standard, p. 59. 4 Imlah, Pax Britannica, pp. 72-4. 5 Brown, World economy, p. 52.
quarter during the period from 1880-1908. 6 Nevertheless, Brown acknowledges that there was likely considerable variation among the bilateral marginal propensities to import from Britain.
Brown identifies New Zealand as a colony with a 'high' marginal propensity to import from Britain. 7 Because New Zealand relied on Britain for more than three-fifths of its imports during the late nineteenth century, the likelihood is that the marginal propensity of New Zealand to import from Britain was quite high, certainly higher than the cross-country average of onequarter. 8 Even within the context of the British Empire, New Zealand stands out for its atypically strong bilateral trade with Britain. 9 In 1890, New Zealand obtained 67 per cent of its imports from Britain, compared to other high-income colonies of the British Empire: Canada (38 per cent), New South Wales (38 per cent), and Victoria (42 per cent). 10 The discrepancy between New Zealand and Canada was largely due to the latter importing manufactured goods from the Situating Ford's argument within economic theory is a difficult task, partly because it pertains specifically to late nineteenth-century Britain, which was far-and-away the foremost supplier to the international markets for both credit and manufactured goods. The Fordian lending-export loop therefore attempts to characterise an economically exceptional country during the period when her exceptionality was most pronounced. Given Mundell's finding that, in a 2x2x2 Heckscher-Ohlin model, the movement of factors and the movement of goods are usually substitutes for each other, Ford's argument describes an unusual economic case. 27 Yet, the nature of British overseas lending in the late nineteenth century helps to explain why British capital and merchandise exports were complements, rather than substitutes. The majority of British overseas lending took the form of social overhead capital: railways, tramways, bridges, ports, etc. In this respect, the movement of a factor (capital) did not directly induce the development of manufacturing in borrowing countries, but instead facilitated greater economic integration. British overseas investment funded the creation of a transportation infrastructure and, consequently, the geographic expansion of the market for British exports.
To a great extent, Ford's argument is one about the British Empire, which absorbed nearly two-fifths of British capital exports during the half-century before the First World War.
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To be sure, the vast sums that London channeled to the Empire were the response of a well- 25 Eichengreen, Alec Ford, p. 66. 26 Ibid., p. 68. 27 Mundell, International trade. He finds that factor immobility increases trade flows, due to commodity price equalisation, and that trade restrictiveness increases factor mobility, due to factor price equalisation. 28 Simon, Portfolio foreign investment, p. 24. This figure excludes Argentina, which is often treated as part of the informal Empire.
functioning capital market to the infrastructural needs of (more often than not) settler colonies.
However, recent research suggests that the large share of lending to the Empire was partly attributable to the penchant that British investors exhibited for the Empire. Ferguson and Schularick estimate that membership in the British Empire conferred, on average, an approximately 100 basis-point reduction in the cost of capital borrowed in London, even after controlling for factors such as gold standard membership. 29 This preference for the Empire was hardly irrational, however. The common British investor, facing information asymmetries, readily identified the Empire with British legal institutions and commercial policies, that is to say, the underpinnings of secure and profitable investment.
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As with capital exports, British merchandise exports also exhibited a distinct empire effect during this period. Mitchener and Weidenmier quantify this effect using a gravity model.
They find that membership in the British Empire alone more than doubled intra-Empire bilateral trade. 31 This finding was reinforced by Jacks, Meissner, and Novy, who estimate the determinants of bilateral trade costs, a standardised measure of the difference between actual and frictionless bilateral trade. When both trading partners were members of the British Empire, bilateral trade costs were halved, ceteris paribus.
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Long before it was quantified, the powerful effect of empire on trade had caused some scholars to regard Britain's imperial markets as soft, which generally meant that British exporters did not have to compete against foreign exporters either to secure or maintain these markets.
Thompson and Magee challenge the so-called 'soft market' thesis. 33 According to them, three criteria must be satisfied in order for a market to be considered soft. 34 First, per capita spending on British exports must increase over time. Second, the share of per capita income spent on British exports must increase over time. And third, the growth rate of per capita spending on British exports must meet or exceed the growth rate of per capita spending on the exports of other countries. Thompson and Magee, who focus their analysis on the dominions, find that 29 Ferguson and Schularick, Empire effect, p. 297. 30 Ibid., p. 284. For a discussion of the information asymmetries that British investors confronted, see Thompson and Magee, Empire and Globalisation, . 31 Mitchener and Weidenmier, Trade and empire, pp. 1813-4. 32 Jacks, Meissner, and Novy, Trade costs, p. 135. 33 Thompson and Magee, Soft touch. The authors acknowledge that previous scholars have not agreed upon a formal definition of a 'soft market', which remains a somewhat vague term, although tends to imply some lack of competition. 34 Ibid., p. 701.
neither Australasia nor Canada satisfy all three criteria, although Australasia had debatable softmarket tendencies in the 1870s. 35 The implication of this finding for the Ford thesis is that the marginal effect of British capital exports on British merchandise exports varied, not only across countries and colonies, but also across time, and it depended upon how successfully British firms competed in each particular imperial market.
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
The method for testing the empirical validity of the Ford thesis is a country ( 39 The log-difference expression of the variables prevents the inclusion of (time-invariant) distance. In other words, the empirical strategy cannot take the form of a gravity model. Most gravity models in economic history use time fixed effects, which is not a feasible approach here, given the small number of countries in the panel. 40 instance of lending would be expected to raise the demand for British merchandise exports, the second instance would not. Without denying that Stone's series present certain shortcomings with respect to the present exercise, these series are nevertheless used in the foregoing analysis, as they remain the only series of bilateral British ex ante lending.
The results of the panel regression are presented in Table 1 . The first two specifications are identical, except for the use of country fixed effects in column 1 and random effects in column 2. Because the Hausman test indicates that there are no systematic differences in the coefficients, column 2 represents the preferred specification, and all further specifications employ random effects. The notable finding in column 2 is that lending (two-year lead) takes on a positive and statistically significant coefficient. It is also reassuring that GDP is statistically significant at the 1% level. In column 3, the variables for lending (one-year lead) and lending (two-year lead) are 'cumulated' in such a manner that the resulting variable is the log difference of lending between periods t -3 and t -1. If a Fordian lending-export loop operated with a oneyear lead on some occasions and with a two-year lead on other occasions, then the division of British ex ante lending between two separate explanatory variables could obfuscate the relationship between British capital and merchandise exports. However, such is not the case, as indicated by the statistically insignificant coefficient of the variable for cumulative lending. Columns 4 and 5 exclude GDP and the terms of trade, respectively. Excluding these explanatory variables increases the magnitude and statistical significance of lending (two-year lead).
In many respects, the model presented here is reminiscent of the model put forward by The meaningful interpretation of the coefficient of lending (two-year lead) is made challenging by the log-difference expression of the variables. Because log differences can be treated as approximations of growth rates, the regression equation can be interpreted as a weighted average of growth rates, with the coefficients functioning as the weights. As such, column 2 implies that a one per cent increase in GDP would have been 22 times more of a determinant of bilateral British merchandise exports than would have been a one per cent increase in lending (two-year lead).
Eschewing this more abstract interpretation in favour of a historically founded one, A considerable portion of public borrowing in the 1870s was not allocated to social overhead projects, but instead to purchasing Maori lands and providing immigrants free passage to the colony. Collectively, the Immigration and Public Works Loan Acts of 1870, 1873, and 1874 authorised the borrowing of £0.7 million for land acquisition and £1.5 million for assisted immigration. Whether borrowing for these purposes resulted in a short-term increase in British merchandise exports is a question this article addresses shortly. In the case of assisted immigration, British lending would more likely have raised demand for British shipping services than for merchandise exports. 47 Stone, Global Export, p. 377. In real terms, the decline in lending was nearly identical at 50.1%, as calculated using the deflator noted in Appendix I. The Baring Crisis was one of the few instances in which bilateral lending was more synchronised. 48 achieved through the centralisation of public finance at the colonial level. Through the 1860s, the provincial governments made recourse to the London capital market. 53 However, as Attard describes, the provinces encountered increasing difficulty in attracting external capital, as both British investors and the London Stock Exchange doubted the creditworthiness of the provinces. 54 The centralisation of public finance at the colonial level effectively occurred in 1867, when the colonial government guaranteed and consolidated the provincial debts. 55 In 1876, the provinces were abolished altogether. Attard argues that the strengthening of the colonial government of New Zealand can be explained by its ability to raise capital for economic development, whereas the provincial governments ultimately proved deficient in this endeavor.
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Indeed, the central government of New Zealand was successful in attracting external capital during the 1870s. While public borrowing abated somewhat in the early 1880s, it resumed again in 1883 to finance another, fainter round of infrastructure building. 57 By this point, the burgeoning public debt had become an acute fiscal concern, especially as New Zealand was amid a depression. 58 In 1887, the newly elected Atkinson ministry adopted a policy of ending railway construction (and its finance) as swiftly as practicable.
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The central government made a distinct return to borrowing in 1895. Some of the borrowing was undertaken to fund the Government Advances to Settlers Act of 1894-yet another instance of borrowing directed toward something other than a social overhead project.
The act, intended to promote capital-intensive family farming, empowered the government to provide mortgages to small landowners for less than the market rate of interest. In 1895, the government issued £1.5 million worth of 3 per cent bonds in the London capital market, which 53 Provincial borrowing in the 1860s was not altogether minor, with Simkin, Dependent Economy, p. 142, noting that provincial debt increased by over £2 million between 1860 and 1868. 54 investors purchased at an average price of £94 8s 9d. 60 This capital was then re-lent to current and prospective small landowners at an interest rate of 5 per cent, undercutting the prevailing interest rates of 6-8 per cent for private mortgages. 61 Most of the original mortgages granted through this scheme represented the refinancing of pre-existing mortgages, rather than the financing of land purchases. 62 The Government Advances to Settlers Act was liberal in its extension of credit, as it permitted the issuance of mortgages to both freeholders and, interestingly, leaseholders. Many of the latter held 'leases-in-perpetuity' from the state, a system of land tenure introduced under the Land Act of 1892. 63 Throughout the early twentieth century, the popularity of the Advances to Settlers scheme continued to grow, and the colony (dominion after 1907) continued to borrow commensurately. By 1913, the nominal value of mortgages owned by the central government of New Zealand amounted to £7.7 million.
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Insofar as the Government Advances to Settlers Act permitted landowners and leaseholders to refinance their pre-existing mortgages through the government, this act brought about a private-to-public debt conversion. Private mortgages were provided through New Zealand's banks, which intermediated between depositors and borrowers, though the depositors were oftentimes Britons seeking to take advantage of more attractive rates. 65 However, circumstances changed following the Baring Crisis of 1890 and the Australian Banking Crisis of 1893, which caused British depositors to become fearful about the stability of overseas banks and to withdraw their deposits. 66 Hawke argues that the objective of the Government Advances to Settlers Act was to prevent the flight of British capital, transmitted through the international banking system, from hampering the availability of mortgages and, by extension, the economic development of the colony. 
Testing for the lending-export loop
Given the diversity of purposes for which New Zealand borrowed capital from Britain, this paper now proceeds to test the applicability of the Ford thesis to the bilateral case of New
Zealand. The regression equation from the previous section is estimated as a time-series for just New Zealand. All of the sources of data remain the same. The results are presented in Table 3 . In annum between 1870 and 1872. 72 The elevated demand for woolens exerted backward pressure along the supply chain, with the consequence that the price of wool increased from 9¼d to 15d per pound. 73 Yet, the strength of the relationship between New Zealand's terms of trade and its merchandise imports from Britain cannot account for the absence of an observable lendingexport loop, since the terms of trade and British ex ante lending are not mutually exclusive determinants.
Was the absence of an observable lending-export loop in the bilateral case of New Zealand due to the fact that not all borrowing was allocated to social overhead projects? Recall the difference between the direct and indirect channels of the Fordian lending-export loop. The direct channel involved an increase in demand for British capital goods exports, whereas the indirect channel involved an increase in the demand for British consumption goods exports.
Lending for a social overhead project would have stimulated demand for capital goods exports via the direct channel and, by raising the income of the borrowing country, would have also There remains the question of the extent to which railway capital formation was actually financed through external borrowing in London, as opposed to through domestic borrowing.
Private railway capital formation was effectively limited to the Wellington and Manawatu Railway Co. and the New Zealand Midland Railway Co., and these companies were financed by British investors. 76 It is assumed that nearly all public railway capital formation was financed externally before 1900. The New Zealand official year-book for 1900 is the first volume in this annual series to decompose the public debt into the amounts raised in London and domestically.
Of the £47.9 million of central government debt outstanding in 1900, £43.3 million (90 per cent) had been raised in London. 77 However, after 1900, there was a marked decline in the dependence 74 Dowie, New Zealand Investment, . 75 Mulcare, Capital formation, p. 78. A related concern is that Mulcare treats the nationalisation of a private railway as public railway capital formation, whereas Dowie, New Zealand Investment, p. 48, explicitly does not. Thus, the spike in the Mulcare series of public railway capital formation in 1895 is likely attributable to the nationalisation of the New Zealand Midland Railway Co. in this year.
76 Le Rossignol and Stewart, Railways in New Zealand, pp. 663 and 665. 77 New Zealand official year-book, 1900, p. 401 . The high share of the public debt raised externally was likely constant prior to 1900. In reconstructing New Zealand's balance of payments, Rosenberg, Capital imports, p. 109, assumes 84 To some extent, therefore, the refrigeration-driven pastoral boom was responsible for the increasing domestic share of public capital formation, which was most noticeable after 1900.
In recognition of the apparent turn-of-the-century break in the externally financed share of New Zealand's public capital formation, the proxy variable of gross railway capital formation 78 Mackay, Public Finance, p. 139. 79 Simkin. Dependent Economy, p. 182. 80 New Zealand official year-book. Not all of the remainder was raised domestically, as a substantial portion was raised in Australia during the early twentieth century. Until the twentieth century, however, a mere £0.2 million of New Zealand's public debt had been raised there. 81 Attard, Australian public borrowing, pp. 166-7. 82 New Zealand official year-book, 1913, p. 792. 83 For the latest reconstructions of New Zealand's real GDP per capita, see Greasley and Oxley, 84 Greasley and Oxley, Pastoral boom, p. 335. is not extended beyond the nineteenth century. Hence, the interval is truncated to 1872-1900 for the remaining specifications of the regression in Table 3 .
One further matter related to the proxy variable requires discussion, and that is the a priori inter-temporal relationship between railway capital formation and British merchandise exports, which would differ from Ford's proposed inter-temporal relationship between British ex ante lending and British merchandise exports. The sequence of these three events (lending, exporting, and capital formation) would proceed generally as follows. British investors would lend ex ante to the New Zealand central government via a primary security issue, with the funds deposited into a bank account. Sometime thereafter, the government would draw upon this account to purchase British capital goods exports. Dowie estimates capital formation using the 'flow of funds' method, whereby capital formation coincides with capital expenditure. 85 Thus, the a priori inter-temporal relationship between British merchandise exports and railway capital formation is a contemporaneous one.
Column 2 of Table 3 replicates the initial specification, but for the truncated interval of 1872-1900. Once again, the coefficients of the lending variables are all statistically insignificant.
Column 3 replaces the lending variables with current-year railway capital formation, the proxy for social overhead lending. The coefficient of railway capital formation is positive and statistically significant at the 5% level. In the case of British lending for social overhead projects, a Fordian lending-export loop emerges. Moreover, the coefficient of railway capital formation in Table 3 is many times greater than the coefficient of lending (two-year lead) in Table 1. A comparison of columns 2 and 3 suggests that the lending-export loop operated when Hatton and Eichengreen. The coefficient of British ex ante lending (two-year lead) was statistically significant at either the 10% or 5% level, depending upon the specification of the regression. The magnitude of this coefficient was small, but far from negligible. Indeed, it was estimated that the Baring Crisis, which precipitated a sharp decline in British overseas lending, curtailed British merchandise exports by several million pounds.
For monetary historians, the magnitude of the coefficient implies that the lending-export loop only minimally offset overseas lending in Britain's multilateral balance of payments. In this sense, Ford's argument does little to advance an understanding of how the classical gold standard worked, at least in the short term. As Eichengreen argues, there was likely a long-term causal relationship between British capital and merchandise exports. Certainly, the role that British capital exports played in the geographic expansion of the market for British exports is a subject ripe for future consideration. The specific focus of this article, though, has been on Ford's argument, which was concerned with just the short term.
The high share of Britain in the country-composition of New Zealand's imports rendered this bilateral case especially appropriate for better understanding the operation of the lending-export loop. Surprisingly, there was no initial evidence for the operation of a lending-export loop in New Zealand. However, when only British ex ante lending for social overhead projects was considered, there emerged an obvious lending-export loop. Furthermore, by distinguishing between capital goods exports and consumption goods exports, it became clear that the operation of the Fordian lending-export loop was due to the direct channel. In this sense, the Ford thesis has been qualified.
At the risk of concluding on a speculative note, perhaps the most significant implications of this article are for imperial history. 
